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ABSTRACT 
John Seely Brown notes that context must be added to data and 
information to produce meaning. To move forward, Brown suggests, we 
must not merely look ahead but we must also learn to “look around” 
because learning occurs when members of a community of practice (CoP) 
socially construct and share their understanding of some text, issue or 
event.  We draw explicitly here on the structural components of a 
Habermasian lifeworld in order to identify some dynamic processes 
through which a specific intellectual capital creating context, community 
of practice (CoP), may be theoretically positioned. Rejecting the 
individualistic “Cogito, ergo sum” of the Cartesians, we move in line with 
Brown’s “We participate, therefore we are” to arrive within a 
Habermasian community of practice: We communicate, ergo, we create.  
 
Keywords:  Community of Practice (CoP); Habermas; Intellectual Capital;  
Workplace Learning 
 
 1
Creating intellectual capital: A Habermasian community of 
practice (CoP) introduction 
 
David O’Donnell 
The Intellectual Capital Research Institute of Ireland 
Gayle Porter 
Rutgers University, U.S.A. 
David McGuire 
University of Limerick, Ireland 
Thomas N. Garavan 
University of Limerick, Ireland 
Margaret Heffernan 
National University of Ireland, Galway 
Peter Cleary 
University College Cork, Ireland 
 
 
The way forward is paradoxically not to look ahead, but to look 
around. (John Seely Brown, 2000) 
 
Introduction 
 
As the industrial morphs rapidly into the digital age a consensus is emerging 
that intellectual capital is displacing land, physical labour and financial capital as the 
primary source of economic and social value. There is, however, little consensus in 
the extant literature on how intellectual capital should be defined, theorised, 
measured, managed or valued (Bontis, 1998; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Sveiby, 1997). 
This complex and fuzzy concept embraces aspects of language, experiences, learning 
processes, data, information and know-how. Drawing on our previous work, 
intellectual capital creation is defined in this paper simply as a socially constructed 
dynamic process of situated collective knowing that is capable of being leveraged into 
economic and social value (O’Donnell, 1999, 2000; O’Donnell and Porter, 2002; 
O’Donnell et al., 2000, 2003; O’Regan et al., 2001). Following the philosophy and 
social theory of Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1987a,b; 1994), we theorise intellectual 
capital creation here as following a human lifeworld communicative or dialogical type 
logic within a community of practice (CoP); and leveraging this form of “capital” into 
economic or social value is based more on an instrumental, system or market based 
logic, although there is probably no definitive boundary between these two “logics” 
(O’Donnell, 2000; Roos et al., 1997).  
According to John Seely Brown (2000), context must be added to data and 
information to produce meaning. To move forward, Brown (2000) suggests—we must 
not limit ourselves to merely looking ahead but we must also learn to “look around” 
because learning occurs when members of a community of practice (CoP) socially 
construct their understanding of some text, issue or event and then share this 
understanding with others. This idea of community of practice has become prominent 
in the business and organisational literature since the early 1990s (Brown and Duguid, 
1991; Wenger, 1998; Wenger and Snyder, 2000) but its theoretical roots can be traced 
to the psychological theory of activity (Engeström, 1990) developed by the 
Vygotskian school of developmental psychology in the Russia of the 1920s.  
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In this brief theoretical paper we draw explicitly on the structural components 
of a Habermasian lifeworld in order to identify some dynamic processes through 
which a specific intellectual capital creating “context”, community of practice (CoP), 
may be theoretically positioned. As Habermas (1996, p. x) himself puts it in applying 
his theory to law and democracy in Between Facts and Norms: 
  
[T]he basic assumptions of the theory of communicative 
action......branch out into various universes of discourse, where they 
must prove their mettle in the contexts of debate they happen to 
encounter.  
 
This lifeworld-in-system perspective seems particularly applicable to the 
current emphasis on workplace learning and collaborative work systems within an 
increasingly knowing intensive economy and society.  Using Habermas’ structural 
components, we outline the importance of each, with CoPs as the nexus linking 
culture, language, and worker/citizen development.  In doing so, we apply 
Habermasian social theory through the lens of community of practice in order to 
attempt to gain both theoretical and practical insights into the process of intellectual 
capital creation and much of workplace learning.  
In this paper we first distinguish between teams and CoPs. We then provide a 
brief introduction to the contours of a Habermasian lifeworld, with CoPs as the nexus 
of such lifeworlds. The procedural aspects of the process of communicative action are 
then outlined. We then discuss, in very general terms, some of the implications of 
adopting this theoretical approach to CoPs in the context of informal workplace 
learning for both research and practice. We conclude that such a theoretical 
positioning is capable of providing social theoretical rigour to relevant discourses in 
this area.  
 
CoPs versus Teams 
 
Communities of Practice (CoPs) are groups formed around a shared interest in 
which discussion builds on the values and motivations of their members. Etienne 
Wenger and William Snyder (2000, pp. 139-40) define CoPs as:  
 
Groups of people informally bound together by shared expertise and 
passion for a joint enterprise—engineers engaged in deep water drilling, 
for example, consultants who specialise in strategic marketing, or frontline 
managers in charge of cheque processing at a large commercial bank. 
Some communities of practice meet regularly—for lunch on Thursdays, 
say—others are connected primarily by e-mail networks. A community of 
practice may or may not have an explicit agenda on a given week, and 
even if it does, it may not follow the agenda closely. Inevitably, however, 
people in communities of practice share their experiences and knowledge 
in free-flowing, creative ways that foster new approaches to problems. 
 
Völpel (2002) argues that intellectual capital is produced on the basis of 
experience and analysis with the help of strategic imagination. Strategic imagination 
is considered to be an emergent property of a complex interplay between descriptive, 
creative and challenging imaginings. Although there is a possible future point at 
which some of the more developed ideas or imaginings that emerge in CoPs may be 
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considered for possible operational or commercial application, the structure of on-
going members’ exchange is interest-based rather than pre-determined by 
managerialist or instrumental goals. Typically a “champion” organises meetings 
(time, place, notification and so on) and keeps things moving along, but CoPs are not 
directly managed by means of the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy.  This 
sidestepping of hierarchical managerial control, the perceived “loss” of time involved, 
and a lack of clearly specified outcomes often makes control-oriented managers 
uncomfortable in a business environment based on performance metrics, deliverables, 
and the more familiar evidence of doing “real” or “tangible” work (O’Donnell and 
Porter, 2002). 
But what is the difference between a team and a CoP? Are CoPs simply 
“teams” rebranded in new clothes to enhance the profitability of the consulting 
industry or the productivity of the academic milieu? From a managerialist perspective 
does one simply manage both in the same way? Not so. Teams and CoPs are 
fundamentally different kinds of groups (see Melcrum (2000) on which this section of 
the paper draws heavily—and Figure 1. below).  
[take in Figure 1 about here] 
Teams are tightly integrated units driven by deliverables, defined by 
managerially allocated tasks and bound together by collective commitment to results 
or goals. This teleological, means-end or goal-oriented nature of a team is what 
categorises it as driven by an instrumental logic. Teams are primarily constructions of 
the system. CoPs, on the other hand, are loosely coupled groups or networks driven by 
both interest in a topic or area and the value that membership provides to members as 
a function of their active involvement.  CoPs are defined by the opportunities to learn, 
share and critically evaluate what they discover or what may unexpectedly emerge. 
Bound by a sense of collective identity, founded on interest and intrinsic value 
expectations, CoPs may be viewed as exhibiting more of what Habermas (1984) 
would term “a communicative logic”, and hence are mainly, if not totally, of the 
lifeworld. Teams and CoPs will, of course, coexist within both profit and not-for-
profit organisations but the key point that we attempt to highlight here is that both 
need to be managed or facilitated differently due to their inherently different logics 
and structural power relations (see Figure 1.)—In fact, we conclude that CoPs cannot 
be “managed” in the traditional control-oriented managerialist manner. 
Unlike teams, CoPs are typically driven by the value that they provide to 
individual members. Members share information and insights and discover ideas—
this saves them time, money, energy and effort. Whereas a team delivers value in the 
result that it produces, a CoP discovers value in the diverse day-to-day processual 
exchanges of data, information, know-how and fellowship. The heart of a team is the 
set of interdependent tasks that leads to a predetermined outcome. The heart of a CoP, 
on the other hand, is the processual know-how that members share, critically evaluate 
and develop. CoPs, therefore, facilitate opportunities for sharing knowledge as they 
arise, and as a result the “hot topics” in a community emerge over time. As topics 
shift some may leave, and new people may join adding different perspectives and 
helping to shape future directions. While teams often have clear boundaries, set roles 
and memberships, CoPs may have many partial, part-time, marginal or loosely-
coupled members. In Habermasian terms, CoPs are primarily interest based and 
driven by a more communicative lifeworld-based logic; in contrast, teams are usually 
formed for a specific means-end purpose and are thus driven by a more instrumental, 
managerialist or system-based logic. 
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 Two distinct time-dependent learning models operate within teams and CoPs. 
Reflective learning in teams is regarded as a process of making connections and 
developing an understanding of a situation by testing intuitive understanding of 
experienced phenomena (Schön, 1983). Learning within teams is often strongly 
shaped by the successes and failures of the past. Experience is looked upon as a 
collective notion and the evaluation of experience involves a simplified time-
pressured search for reasons, patterns and logic coupled with a determination to avoid 
the mistakes of the past, while hoping to replicate triumphs in the future. In contrast, 
learning within a CoP is viewed as a reflexive engagement through dialogue in an 
attempt to make sense of, and created meaning from, experience (Cunliffe, 2002; 
Watson, 1994). Reflexive learning is the process of complexifying thinking or 
experience by exposing contradictions, doubts, dilemmas and possibilities (Chia, 
1996; Cranton, 1996; West, 1996).  
In summation, a community of practice is, therefore, a group that is defined by 
a different logic to a team—such groups share knowledge, learn together, create new 
knowledge, create common practices, and develop a sense of solidarity and personal 
responsibility and autonomy. CoP members frequently help each other to solve 
problems and develop new approaches or tools for their field. This makes it 
emotionally easier for community members to show their weak spots and learn 
together in what could be termed the reflexive  “public sphere” of the community—
whether this be the back table in the company canteen, a local coffee shop or bar, a 
quiet stroll through the corridors, an email list or an online chat-room.  In the 
following section, we draw out the contours of how CoPs may be theoretically 
positioned in a Habermasian lifeworld and how such CoPs contribute to both 
worker/citizen and organisational development. 
 
CoPs-in-Lifeworld-in-System 
At a very broad level, Habermas (1984; 1987a,b; 1994) divides developed 
capitalist society into three basic sub-systems: Money, Power and Lifeworld. The 
instrumental means-end logic of the systems of money and power is geared to 
success, efficiency, control, profit or market share; in contrast, the communicative 
logic of the human lifeworld is geared to understanding and agreement. This 
distinction between goal-oriented instrumental action and communicative action is a 
core distinction at the foundation of Habermasian social theory. Teams, as noted 
above, are driven mainly by the logic of instrumental means-end success; CoPs, on 
the other hand, can be viewed as being driven mainly by the logic of communicative 
action, communicative understanding and communicative learning. Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action (1984,1987a) allows for both System and Lifeworld 
perspectives to be included in any analysis of workplace learning. Members of a 
social collective, such as a CoP, normally share a largely intangible and tacit lifeworld 
that only exists in a “uniquely pre-reflexive form of background assumptions, 
background receptivities or background relations” (Honneth et al., 1981, p. 16). Such 
background lifeworlds must be conceived, according to Habermas (1987a, p. 124), as 
“culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock(s) of interpretative patterns”. 
 Stocks and flows of “knowing” are viewed as central in generating new ideas 
and imaginings and then leveraging these into value, whatever one’s definition of 
value. Language, culture, communications, dialogue, idea generation, imaginings and 
knowledge sharing are all key issues in the emerging discourses on communities of 
practice, intellectual capital, knowledge management, and workplace learning.  
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It is these emphases on dialogue, knowledge generation and sharing, the 
freedom for agendas to emerge, the bracketing of time, and the sidelining of the 
traditional organisational hierarchy based on power and rigid managerial control that 
suggest that we explore what we might learn from Habermas. CoPs appear to manifest 
more of the attributes of a Lifeworld setting than of a System setting, although many 
CoPs must function within a system or organisational environment—hence the 
possible suitability and applicability of a Habermasian lifeworld-in-system 
perspective on CoPs. CoPs are not primarily goal-driven (teleological or instrumental 
logic; of the system—defined by management)—they are mainly interest driven 
(communicative logic; of the lifeworld—defined and organically decided on by 
workers/citizens themselves). This is the social theoretical distinction that we wish to 
introduce, explore and tease out a little in this paper.   
Habermas (1987a), following Parsons’ ideas on culture, society and 
personality, provides us with broad theoretical guidelines on how to conceptualise 
lifeworlds (Figure 2). The boundary between system (money; power) and human 
lifeworld is, however, not a clear-cut one, even within formal organisational 
settings—they interpenetrate and reciprocally influence each other, although much 
discourse on workplace learning assumes a tacitly managerialist perspective.  
[take in Figure 2. about here] 
The structural components of particular lifeworlds (culture, community of 
practice, selves) meet their corresponding needs (cultural reproduction, social 
integration, socialisation and selves-development) through three dimensions along 
which communicative action is conducted (reaching understanding, coordinating 
interaction, effecting socialisation) which in turn are rooted in the structural 
components of ordinary everyday language and communications. The effective 
functioning of a CoP can be evaluated using the dimensions of rationality of 
knowledge (communicative versus instrumental), member solidarity, and 
personal/group responsibility (O’Donnell, 1999, 2000; O’Donnell et al., 2000, 2003). 
Viewing CoPs through the lens of communicative action within a 
Habermasian lifeworld provides us with strong theoretical guidelines to assist us in 
conceptualising issues related to workplace learning and intellectual capital creation. 
Such a framework is particularly suited to interpretive, case study or ethnographic 
research—as well as educating those managers who erroneously believe that it their 
duty to control or rigidly manage CoPs. 
For example, selves-development requires achieving openness to continuous 
learning, challenge, fedback, constructive criticism and growth. This openness 
contributes to an understanding of both personal and CoP identities.  These identities 
and interpretative abilities allow for social memberships to form, which, in turn help 
to mould the interests, behaviour patterns, values, norms and learning goals of 
particular CoPs. Their behaviour and future goals evolve from these identities and 
social memberships that are initially learned through communicative dialogue 
(O’Donnell and Porter, 2002). 
At the level of organisational culture managers can assist by facilitating the 
cultural context of emergence—and then stepping back and letting go. Within this 
culture workers negotiate their own norms of behaviour—CoP members gradually 
agree on boundaries for pursuing personal preferences as well as having some 
consideration for each other’s needs.  These norms eventually become part of a tacitly 
“taken-for-granted” social contract that guides behavioural processes within a CoP.  
Situating community of practice (CoP) within a Habermasian lifeworld is 
central to the argument that we present here. CoPs self-develop as people grow an 
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understanding of their shared interests and begin to generate ideas about its meaning. 
The socialisation process is a gradual integration of individual interests and 
motivations into a shared collective focus.  CoPs take on some loose order in how 
people gather and interact, gaining legitimacy without becoming over-
institutionalised.  Providing that a CoP is compatible with existing organisational 
culture, it is capable of providing growth opportunities (for both members and the 
organisation) that otherwise would probably not exist. Not growth in size, necessarily, 
but growth in ideas—alternative perspectives and imaginings on approaches to 
products, customers, internal work processes, inter-company relations, and many 
other personal and organisational factors. Such CoPs are held together and 
regenerated through the medium of communicative action. In the next section we go 
somewhat deeper into this key concept. 
 
Communicative action 
 
Lifeworlds are held together and regenerated through the medium of what 
Habermas terms “communicative action”. At a fundamental level, intellectual capital 
is created when two human beings communicate, by whatever means available, with 
each other. Communicative action refers to the set of symmetric and reciprocal 
relations within the communicative relation between at least two people. We suggest 
that this dialectical relation is at the core of intellectual capital creation within CoPs. 
From this perspective, interaction, as distinct from individual action, becomes the 
basic unit of theoretical analysis in CoPs. Habermas (1984, p. 86) defines 
communicative action as follows: 
 
Communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two subjects 
capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations 
(whether by verbal or extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an 
understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order 
to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of 
interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the 
situation [that] admit of consensus.  
 
 
The ability to raise “validity claims” within this communicative relation is 
central to the theory of communicative action (O’Donnell, 2000). We claim here that 
validity claims are also central to the effective functioning of critical dialogue within 
CoPs. When two people communicate with each other, face-to-face, body-language or 
electronically mediated, each utterance that alter makes can be implicitly or explicitly 
accepted or challenged by ego on a simple “Yes” or “No” basis. Alter is seen as 
making a claim to validity with each utterance and ego can either accept or reject this 
claim.   
Validity claims of propositional truth and/or efficacy relate to the objective 
world of facts and/or states of affairs; for example if alter states that the area of a 
triangle is one third of the base times the height, ego can reject this claim explicitly 
with a “No” and provide evidence that the area of a triangle is one half the base times 
the height; if a CoP member states that the new knowledge management system is 
working superbly another may explicitly refuse to accept the validity of the statement, 
seek further evidence from others, or produce her own evidence to show that the 
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efficiency with which the system is working is inferior to their competitors in terms of 
skills-development and benchmarking.   
The validity claim of normative rightness relates to the social world “around 
here”—what is generally considered normative, socially acceptable and usually 
“taken for granted” behaviour; for example, a new manager in the HR division 
arrives, decides to join a CoP on HR issues, and at his first CoP meeting in the 
canteen intimates to the other members that as he is the senior person present he 
should set the agenda—only to be politely informed that “you can’t pull rank on us 
like that around here!—this is our community of practice, not yours!”, that is, the 
validity of this manager’s actions are not accepted by the CoP members as they do not 
conform to the autonomous norms of this particular CoP. Such an interfering control-
oriented manager is, in effect, a threat to the effective functioning of such 
hypothetical CoPs.  
The validity claim of sincerity/authenticity relates to the (inter)subjective 
world and is often accepted or rejected implicitly and silently by ego who decides 
whether alter is being genuine, sincere or authentic. When rejected explicitly, one 
may hear such comments as – “Get real”, “Pull the other one”, and so on. What is 
distinctive about these validity claims is that thinking about them in the overall 
context of a Habermasian lifeworld may provide us with insight into both the depth 
and quality of the communicative interactions between members of a CoP as well as 
providing empirical entry points to guide case study or ethnographic research in this 
area. 
As the brief discussion on validity claims above is designed to demonstrate, 
communicative action is a fragile process and when this process is endangered by 
system influences (such as managers thinking that they can rigidly control CoPs), 
CoPs suffer. By implication, anything that negatively influences the ability to raise or 
voice these validity claims will reduce, or perhaps even destroy, the effective 
functioning of  CoPs.  
Using Habermas’ dimensions of evaluation, we can seek to identify areas 
where systemic influences colonise or destroy effective aspects of particular CoPs 
leading to experiences such as loss of meaning, anomie, various forms of alienation, 
rupturing of traditions and the unsettling of collective identities (see Figure 2)—in 
other words, to influences that prevent CoPs from emerging within the system logic of 
organisational settings, reduce their effectiveness, or perhaps destroy them 
completely. Drawing once again on some of the fundamental points of Habermas’ 
massive oeuvre, we now have a social theoretical map within which we can begin to 
think substantively about CoPs and workplace learning from a critical lifeworld-in-
system perspective.  
People-centered organisational models are premised on the realisation that the 
structural systemic influences of money and power may, in some cases, constrain the 
creative potential of employees. To be value-driven, management must make space 
available to allow employees to talk, interact and share knowledge. Communities of 
practice provide one example of an organisational innovation designed to facilitate 
workplace learning and innovation through promoting reflexive learning, which in 
turn may generate value-adding ideas for products, processes or services. Workplace 
learning occurs as a result of the social interactions of people. Further research needs 
to focus on identifying the processes, behaviours, values, norms, rituals, stories, and 
motivations that distinguish high performance CoPs from poor ones. Further, such 
research should examine in detail the structural effects of money and power on the 
functioning of such CoPs in order to distinguish structural effects that are positive 
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from those that constrain. An initial starting point for such comparisons would be the 
distinction between CoPs that have a high output of intellectual capital from those that 
do not.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Most contributions on intellectual capital focus on two main issues; how it is 
created and how it is leveraged into market value, although there is probably no 
definitive boundary between the two (Roos et al., 1997; Spender and Grant, 1996). As 
knowing-intensive work within CoPs is highly reflexive and end goals or destinations 
are often ill-defined or even unknown, the norms governing the mode of discourse, 
the dialectical to-and-fro in the search for the better argument, will be expected to 
influence both the productivity of the group, network or CoP and the eventual market 
or social value of the intellectual capital created. This sense of how one participates 
and acknowledges the other is central to the growth of both personal and CoP 
identities.   Processes of knowledge sharing and cooperative intellectual capital 
creation within a CoP demand certain levels of communicative competence. 
According to Habermas (1984, p. 95): 
 
Only the communicative model of action presupposes language as a 
medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out 
of the context of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to 
things in the objective, social and subjective worlds in order to negotiate 
common definitions of the situation.  
 
Brown (2000) suggests that we think of the world through Cartesian lenses: “I 
think. Therefore, I am.” This attitude has led to theories of pedagogy and human 
development based on simplistic notions of pouring a pitcher of knowledge into an 
individual’s head.  A better set of lenses, Brown (2000) suggests, is provided by: 
 
We participate.  Therefore we are… In participation with others, we come 
into being. Understanding is socially constructed.  Things are learned in 
and through discussion.   
 
In summary, our discussion has emphasised communicative collaboration, 
particularly when achieved in ways that allow for evolutionary growth in addition to 
goal-oriented activity.  To support the existence of more free-flowing collaboration, 
management must give attention to permitting and sustaining the cultural lifeworld 
context for such CoPs within the usual instrumental goal-driven system logic of any 
organisation. Applying Habermasian social theory to intellectual capital creation 
within CoPs suggests something of a paradox as management must be willing to relax 
its strong bias toward goal-oriented activity for some portion of operational activities. 
Leaders must demonstrate commitment to the freedom of communicative action, and 
manage in a way that aligns the relevant lifeworld structures and reproduction 
processes needed to support CoPs. Rejecting the individualistic “Cogito, ergo sum” of 
the Cartesians, we go with the flow of Brown’s “We participate, therefore we are” to 
arrive, however tentatively, within a Habermasian community of practice: We 
communicate, ergo, we create.  
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Figure 1. Teams versus Communities of Practice 
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• Value in result delivered 
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Defined by task 
• Interdependent tasks 
• Clear boundaries 
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• Interdependent knowledge 
• Permeable boundaries 
Develops through a work plan 
• Everyone contributes 
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objectives and work plan 
Develops organically 
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• Managed by making connections 
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• Team leader or manager 
Bound by identification—shared identity 
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• Based on trust 
• Core group/coordinator 
Reflective Learning 
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Reflexive Learning 
• Dialogical Process 
• Constructive Focus 
Source: Broadly based on Melcrum (2000) 
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Figure 2. Contours of a Habermasian Lifeworld-in-System. 
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Source: O’Donnell and Henriksen, (2002, p. 95)  
 
 13
